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COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICIES UNDER MAINE'S GROUND
WATER PROTECTION ACT: THE LAW
COURT'S EXTRAORDINARY DEFINITION
OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Patrons Oxford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marois,' the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, joined the current

debate in the state and federal judiciaries as to whether comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies 2 obligate the insurer
to indemnify the insured for cleanup costs 3 incurred pursuant to
governmentally mandated cleanup of hazardous substances. In that
decision, the court held that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to
court order authorized by the Maine Underground Oil Storage Facilities and Ground Water Protection Act 4 are not covered by such policies. The explicit basis of the court's decision was that the average
Maine insured understands that state-mandated cleanup of hazardous spills is a form of equitable relief for which CGL policies provide
no coverage. The decision leaves many Maine businesses and individuals uninsured against the risk of liability for cleanup costs, with
a resulting negative effect on the manner and speed in which hazardous spills are cleaned up.' The Patrons Oxford decision is there1. 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990).
2. The Maroises' Special Multi-Peril Policy provided coverage for "all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of... property
damage." Appendix on Appeal at 30, Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573
A.2d 16 (Me. 1990) (No. KEN-89-284) [hereinafter Appendix on Appeal). This lan.
guage is identical to that found in standard, industry-wide CGL policies. For a good
discussion of the historical development of CGL policies, see Stephen Mountainspring, Insurance Coverage of CERCLA Response Costs: The Limits of "Damages" in
Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 16 EcOLOGY LQ 755, 759 (1989).
3. "Cleanup costs" are not defined by the Maine Underground Oil Storage Facilities and Ground Water Protection Act, Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 561 to 570-H
(West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991). The term refers generically to any sums a polluter
spends, or is compelled to spend, in complying with a government directive ordering
the polluter to clean up a hazardous discharge.
4. P.L. 1985, ch. 496, § A (effective June 28, 1985) (codified as M. Ray. STAT
ANN. tit. 38, §§ 561 to 570-H (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991)). The Maine Act essentially follows its federal counterpart, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1989).
5. In his amicus curiae brief filed in support of the Maroises, the Attorney General of Maine stated:
The interest of the Attorney General as amicus stems from the fact that
this appeal presents a significant issue of concern to the people of Maine
....
The resolution of this issue under Maine law may affect dramatically
the manner in which the numerous spills of petroleum products occurring
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fore at odds with a law intended to ensure prompt cleanup of hazardous spills.6
While this coverage question is supercharged by the growing
awareness and concern over environmental policy, the policy debates
are ancillary to the question at hand. As the Law Court correctly
noted, resolution of this question reduces to a contractual equation
and the calculus is quite simple: the court need only apply governing
state contract law to the insurance policy at issue.7 Nevertheless,
this Comment will take up the contract issue in its broader national
context for two reasons: first, Maine's prevailing principles of insurance contract interpretation are substantially similar to those of
every state that has considered this coverage question;8 second, the
language of the special multi-peril liability policy issued to the insureds in the Patrons Oxford case is substantially similar to the language found in standardized, industry-wide CGL policies.9
Generally, whether cleanup costs are covered by CGL policies is
determined by the reasonable expectations of the average layperson
unschooled in the law or the insurance field. 10 Therefore, each court
must ultimately decide whether the average layperson would understand that the term "damages," as found in the scope and exclusions
clauses of the CGL policies, refers to "legal" as opposed to "equitable" relief. In part, the debate is inspired by the fact that the term
"damages" is not defined in these insurance policies.1" It is importhroughout this state are cleaned up.
Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Appellants Norman and Julia Marois, dfb/a S &
M Market at 2, Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990) (No.
KEN-89-284) (submitted by James E. Tierney, Attorney General of Maine) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief].
6. "The Legislature intends by the enactment of this subchapter ... to require
the prompt containment and removal of pollution ...
" ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 561 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
7. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 17.
8. Compare, e.g., Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990)
with Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990). In
general, the controlling legal principles of insurance contract interpretation provide
that clear terms of a contract are to be strictly construed, but that ambiguous terms
are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Whether a term is ambiguous
depends upon the reasonable expectations of the average layperson unschooled in the
law or insurance field. See infra notes 95, 96 and accompanying text. Although each
state has put its own individual gloss on these principles, there does not appear to be
any substantial variance that would explain the schism between the two competing
answers to the coverage question at issue in this Comment.
9. See supra note 2.
10. The standard by which insurance policies are interpreted is a question of state
law. This Comment will refer to Maine's particular phraseology, as articulated in
Union Mut. Fire Ins. v. Commercial Union Ins., 521 A.2d 308, 310 (Me. 1987). See
infra note 94 and accompanying text.
11. Although the 1966 version of the industry-wide CGL policy defined "damages" as including "damages for loss of use of property resulting from property damage," that definition was not helpful and was ultimately stricken. See Mountainspr-
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tant to understand from the outset that the courts denying indemnification for cleanup costs do so on the basis that the legal, technical
meaning of the term "damages" excludes equitable relief. The courts
that provide indemnification do so on the basis that, notwithstanding the legal definition of "damages," the average layperson reasonably expects coverage for cleanup costs. This Comment will discuss
the distinction between legal and equitable relief only to the extent
that a full discussion of the coverage question demands consideration of that distinction.
The coverage question as a whole is quite complex, inasmuch as
the CGL policies are rife with exclusions, and the relevant environmental statutes are multifaceted. For the purposes of this Comment,
it will be assumed that (1) property damage has occurred,' (2) the
insured is a responsible party, (3) the insured may be compelled to
clean up the discharge, and (4) the only issue for determination is
whether or not the insured is covered against cleanup costs.
In section II of this Comment, the history of the dispute underlying the Patrons Oxford decision will be examined because those
facts illustrate the interplay between the three significant parties to
such disputes: the governing agency, the responsible party, and the
insurer. In section III, the arguments presented by both state and
federal courts in support of their determinations of the coverage
question will be discussed. In section IV, the Patrons Oxford case
will be evaluated in the context of the conclusions drawn in section
I. Finally, the implications of the Patrons Oxford decision will be
discussed with respect to Maine businesses and individuals.
II.

THE OIL SPILL AT THE S & M MARKET

A. Some Alternative Statutory Remedies Under the Maine
Underground Oil Storage Facilities and Ground Water Protection
Act
The Patrons Oxford dispute arises under the Maine Underground
Oil Storage Facilities and Ground Water Protection Act (Act).' 3 As
reflected by the Act's statement of purpose, the discharge of oil and
similar products into Maine's underground water supplies is a mating, supra note 2, at 759. For one court's discussion of the unhelpful nature of that
definition, see AIU Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1259 n.3 (Cal. 1990) (finding the definition not all-inclusive, and therefore ambiguous).
12. While the question whether contamination of a public water source constitutes "property damage" has spawned a debate of its own, it is beyond the scope of
this Comment. See generally Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796

F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F.
Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of EnvtL Protection, 350

A.2d 520 (N.J. 1975); Kutsher's Country Club Corp. v. Lincoln Ins., 119 Misc. 2d 889,
465 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1983).
13. M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 561 to 570-H (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
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ter of increasing concern.14 The Act was implemented in order to
facilitate the speedy and effective cleanup of discharged hazardous
substances.15 To this end, the Maine Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) was endowed by statute with broad powers with
which to effectuate hazardous discharge cleanup.18 These powers include the discretionary authority to issue a cleanup order requiring
the responsible party to "cease the discharge immediately or to take
action to prevent further discharge and to mitigate or terminate the
threat" to public health or environment.1 7 Alternatively the DEP
may:
undertake [on its own] the removal of that discharge and retain
agents and contractors for that purpose who shall operate under
the commissioner's direction ....
Any expenses involved in the removal of discharges ... by the commissioner ... may be paid in

the first instance from the Ground Water Oil Clean-up Fund and
reimbursements due that fund must be collected in accordance
with section 569.18

This Comment is chiefly concerned with cleanup orders and their
resulting effect on a polluter's insurance coverage. Cleanup orders
under section 568 are injunctive in nature, and therefore are properly deemed a form of equitable relief.
9
B. Patrons Oxford: The Underlying Dispute"
20
Norman and Julia Marois, in partnership with George Starkey,
owned and operated the S & M Market, a small grocery store located in South China, Maine, that sold gasoline on a retail basis as

14. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 561 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991) states in
relevant part:
The Legislature finds that significant quantities of oil [the Act's definition of oil, found at § 562-A(15), includes gasoline] are being stored in underground storage facilities; that leaks and unlicensed discharges from
these facilities pose a significant threat to the quality of the waters of the
State, including the ground water resources; [and] that protection of the
quality of these waters is of the highest importance.
15. See supra note 6. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 570 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1990-1991), which states that, "it is the intent of this [Act] to provide the
means for rapid and effective cleanup and to minimize direct damages as well as indirect damages and the proliferation of 3rd-party claims."
16. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 568 (West 1989 & Supp. 19901991).
17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 568(3) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
18. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 568(1) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
19. The facts set forth below are drawn from the Stipulation of the parties, found
in the Appendix on Appeal, supra note 2, at 7-8, the DEP's Clean Up Order, found in
the Appendix on Appeal at 33-43, and the Board of Environmental Protection's
Clean Up Order, found in the Appendix on Appeal at 44-50.
20. George Starkey died in 1987. Brief for Appellant at 1 n.2, Patrons Oxford
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990) (No. KEN-89-284).
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part of its business. Lathe Fuel Company (Lathe), of Augusta,
Maine, installed, owned, and operated three gasoline pumps at the S

& M Market. In September, 1985, the Department of Human Services' Public Health Laboratory notified the DEP that a water sample taken from the private drinking well supplying the S & M Market and the Starkey residence, located within twenty feet of the
underground gasoline tanks at the market, was contaminated with
what appeared to be gasoline. In January, 1986, the DEP received a
complaint from Edward Poulin that his water supply, located within
700 feet of the S & M Market, was contaminated with gasoline.
Based on the contamination of these two wells, the DEP sampled
the water supplies of other nearby residences, and found that two
other wells within 800 feet of the S & M Market were also contaminated with gasoline. When remedial measures taken by the DEP
failed to adequately remedy the contamination, the DEP requested
that Lathe prepare and submit to the DEP a remedial action plan. 1
In response, Lathe notified the DEP that it would do no more than
remove contaminated soil and pave the former tank and pump area.
Due to Lathe's refusal to voluntarily clean up the discharge, in
July, 1988, the DEP issued a cleanup order,2 2 finding both Lathe
and the Maroises to be "responsible parties.1 2 In that order, the
21. The DEP's request for the submission of a remedial action plan was authorized by ME_ Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 568(3) (West Supp. 1990-1991). The remedial
action plan was to address the following issues: (1) determine the existence of gasoline-contaminated soil in the area of the tanks and pumps at the market and develop
a method to prevent continued introduction of gasoline into groundwater, (2) determine the effectiveness of the aeration system in preventing migration of gasoline contaminated groundwater; and (3) restore or replace the four water supplies that became contaminated due to the discharge of gasoline at the S & M Market. Appendix
on Appeal, supra note 2, at 40-41.
Although the DEP's request was directed solely to Lathe, Mr. Marois indicated in a
letter to the DEP that he believed that Lathe was wholly responsible, and that he
would not voluntarily accept responsibility for remedial work.
22. The Clean Up Order was issued pursuant to Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 38.
§ 568(3) (West Supp. 1990-1991), which states in relevant part:
If the commissioner finds, after investigation, that a discharge of oil has
occurred and may create a threat to public health or the environment...
the commissioner may order the responsible party to cease the discharge
immediately or to take action to prevent further discharge and to mitigate
or terminate the threat. The commissioner may order that the responsible
party take temporary and permanent remedial actions at locations
threatened or affected by the discharge of oil, including a requirement that
the responsible party restore or replace water supplies contaminated with
oil ....
23. MF REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 562-A(17) (West Supp. 1990-1991) defines a
responsible party as follows:
"Responsible party" means any one or more of the following persons:
A. The owner or operator of the underground oil storage facility
where a prohibited discharge has occurred;
B. The person to whom the underground oil storage facility is

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:139

DEP determined that the site of the underground tanks at the
S & M Market was the source of the gasoline contamination of the
groundwater in the surrounding area, and ordered both parties to
develop and implement a remedial action plan that would restore
24
and replace the water supply in the area around the market.
Shortly thereafter, both Lathe and the Maroises appealed the DEP's
cleanup order to the Board of Environmental Protection (Board).2
Prior to the hearing before the Board, Lathe entered into a voluntary consent order with the DEP and withdrew its request for a
hearing. This consent order superseded the DEP's cleanup order
with respect to Lathe only. The Maroises proceeded with their appeal. Following the hearing before the Board, the Board issued a
cleanup order requiring the Maroises to permit Lathe access to the
premises to perform its obligations under the voluntary consent order and further requiring that if Lathe's activities failed to restore
groundwater quality, the Maroises could be ordered to prepare and
implement a remedial action plan.26
registered where a prohibited discharge has occurred;
C. Any person other than those identified in paragraph A or B
who caused the prohibited discharge of oil or who had custody or
control of the oil at the time of the prohibited discharge; or
D. Any person who owned or operated the underground oil storage facility from the time any oil arrived at that facility.
This section is substantially similar to its predecessor, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 562(10) (West 1989) repealed by P.L. 1989 ch. 865, § 1 (effective April 1990).
24. Appendix on Appeal, supra note 2, at 33, 39-40 (DEP Clean Up Order (July
21, 1988)).
25. The appeal procedure under the Act is set forth at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 568(3)(B) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
26. Pursuant to ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 568(3)(B) (West Supp. 1990-1991),
on October 12, 1988, the Board ordered the Maroises to:
1. Permit Lathe Fuel Company, the Department of Environmental Protection and all agents, employees or independent contractors of either Lathe
Fuel Company or the Department of Environmental Protection, free and
complete access to the premises of S & M Market and all surrounding property owned by the Marois [sic] and to use utilities at the S & M Market on
the Marois residence as necessary to permit Lathe Fuel Company to carry
out its responsibilities under the Consent Order.
2. If in the sole discretion of DEP, the activities of Lathe Fuel Company
under the Consent Order do not prevent migration of gasoline contaminated ground water in the vicinity of S & M Market and restore the ground
water quality in this area then, within forty-five (45) days of receipt of written notice by the DEP, submit to the Department for its review and approval, a remedial action plan (including an implementation schedule),
based upon the studies conducted by Lathe Fuel Company pursuant to the
Consent Order and all other available information. This plan shall, at a
minimum:
(a) Propose methodology to prevent migration of gasoline contaminated ground water in the vicinity of S & M Market and restore ground water quality to levels protective of public health
and the environment; and
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Upon learning of the Board's order naming the Maroises responsible parties, potentially liable for the cleanup costs associated with
restoring and replacing the water supply to four separate residences,
the Maroises' insurer, Patrons Oxford Mutual Insurance Company
(Patrons Oxford), filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in the
Kennebec County Superior Court in October, 1988.27 In that complaint, Patrons Oxford set the stage for the Law Court to enter the
national debate, stating that the remedial measures contemplated
by the Board's order were of an equitable nature, did not comprise
legal damages, and were therefore not covered by the Maroises'
policy.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE NATIONAL DEBATE

The DEP's decision to issue a cleanup order to the Maroises illustrates the nature of the dispute as to whether cleanup costs incurred
pursuant to governmental mandate are covered by standard CGL
policies. In this section the arguments most often raised in support
of a court's determination of the coverage question will be presented
and discussed. A fair assessment of these arguments is that the crux
of the debate is about the meaning of the term "damages" as that
term is used in the scope clause of the CGL policies which provide
coverage for "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage." ' As noted in
the Introduction, there are many issues related to this coverage
question. Nevertheless, the sole issue with which this Comment is
concerned is the meaning of the term "damages" in CGL policies.
It will be demonstrated that the determinative factor as to
whether cleanup costs are covered as "damages" is the reasonable
expectations of the average layperson. The courts that deny coverage, representing a clear minority, do so on the basis that the term
"damages," as a matter of state law, has a precise technical meaning
(b) Provide for the restoration or replacement of water supplies
determined by the Department to have been contaminated by a
discharge of gasoline at S & M Market.
3. Within fifteen (15) days of the Department's approval of the remedial
action plan and implementation schedule required in paragraph 2 above,
implement the plan as modified and approved by the Department in accordance with the time schedule approved by the Department.
Appendix on Appeal for Appellants at 48-49, Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marais,
573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990) (order after Appeal from DEP Clean Up Order (Oct. 12.
1988)).
27. Patrons Oxford's Complaint was filed pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment
Act, MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5951-5163 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990-1991). The
Complaint can be found at Appendix on Appeal at 4-5, Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990).
28. See Mountainspring, supra note 2, at 759. See also Appendix on Appeal.
supra note 2, at 30 1.
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that is understood by the insured.2 9 Courts that require coverage for
response costs, representing a clear majority, do so on one of two
bases: most courts have found that strictly construing "damages" in
consonance with its technical legal meaning is contrary to controlling state law principles governing contract interpretation; 30 other
courts have held that the substantive similarities between damages
3
and cleanup costs require that cleanup costs be covered. 1
A.

The Minority View: The Technical, Legal Definition of
"Damages" Controls

While different courts have formulated various arguments to support their own particular views, it is generally the case that, if thirdparty property damage is assumed and other policy exclusions have
no effect, there is essentially one argument advanced by courts finding that response costs are not covered under the damages clause of
CGL policies.32 The argument basically states that the policy language clearly and unambiguously includes coverage only for legal
damages, as opposed to equitable relief.
1.

Historical Background: Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v.
Hanna and Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co.
The argument that "damages" in this context has a precise technical meaning in law can be traced to the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hanna,33 and the New Hampshire
34
Supreme Court's decision in Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co.
The argument proceeds as follows:
(1) The term "damages" is clear and unambiguous.
29. See infra note 32.
30. See infra note 65.
31. See infra note 66.
32. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988)
(applying South Carolina law); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (applying Missouri law), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 821 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir.
1987) (applying Maryland law), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958 (D. Idaho 1989) (applying Idaho law); Verlan, Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (applying Illinois law); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Electric of Washington, Inc.,
685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (applying Washington law); Ladd Constr. Co. v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 391 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Patrons Oxford
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990); Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707
(S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
Some courts have also argued that response costs are not covered because they are
available without a requisite showing of "property damage" and are therefore beyond
the scope of the CGL policies. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources
& Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958 (D. Idaho 1989).
33. 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
34. 106 A.2d 196 (N.H. 1954).
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(2) "Damages" has an accepted technical meaning in law-it relates only to legal relief.
(3) Injunctive orders are equitable relief.
(4) Therefore, costs of compliance with injunctive orders are not
covered "damages" as the term "damages" is used in CGL policies.

Both Hanna and Desrochers hold that although injunctive relief requires the responsible party to spend money to comply with the in-

junction, such sums are not "damages" because they do not directly
compensate the damaged party. Rather, those courts find legally sig-

nificant the fact that compliance costs are not directly attributable
to a cleanup order, but are only incidental to an order.,, The Hanna
court stated:
Insofar as coverage is concerned, the obligation is solely "to pay,"
not to remove fill dirt, rocks and boulders, under Court order or
otherwise ...
Clearly, the policy covers only payments to third persons when
those persons have a legal claim for damages against the Insured
on account of injury to or destruction of property.3

Similarly, the Desrochers court stated, "[t]he cost of compliance
with the mandatory injunction is not reasonably to be regarded as a
sum payable 'as damages.' Damages are recompense for injuries
37
sustained.
All of the courts which have adopted this reasoning in the context
of hazardous-discharge cleanup share the basic premise that cleanup
costs by definition are not damages, and therefore as a matter of law
are not covered by CGL policies.3 8 A fair interpretation of this view
is that the substance of the underlying claim, however meritorious,
may be defeated by the form of relief sought by the damaged party.
Significantly, these courts ignore the practical reality that, in all
probability, the polluter will not actually physically conduct the
35. The short-sightedness of this view was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). The issue presented was whether
a polluter's obligation pursuant to a cleanup order is dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code. The Court found that the polluter could not personally clean up the
discharge, and therefore could not comply with the cleanup order other than by paying money. Since the State had appointed a receiver to fulfill the polluter's obligation,
the Court concluded that the State sought nothing more than payment of money so
that the receiver could complete the polluter's obligations. Thus, the view that compliance costs are merely incidental to cleanup orders is belied by the fact that in most
cases a polluter will be unable personally to conduct a cleanup.
36. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503.
37. Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 106 A.2d at 198.
38. See supra note 32. It must be noted that the validity of a given court's reliance on the argument outlined above depends wholly upon the terms of the insurance
policy and the forum state's principles governing the interpretation of insurance contracts. Thus, each court's decision must be evaluated solely on the basis of governing
state law-no court can properly adopt another court's decision without first considering whether or not governing law is substantially similar.
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cleanup. Rather, a contractor will likely be hired and paid to do the
work. Thus, if the damaged party hires a contractor to conduct the
cleanup, and subsequently sues the polluter for compensatory damages, the damages will be covered by the CGL policies. If, on the
other hand, the State compels the polluter to conduct the cleanup,
and the polluter hires the same contractor, at the same price, to undertake the same cleanup, the costs under this rationale are not covered by the CGL policies.
2. The Modern View: Hanna and Desrochers Revisited
The two leading decisions supporting the minority view were rendered by the Fourth Circuit in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco,
Inc. 3 1 and by the Eighth Circuit in Continental Insurance Compa-

nies v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO)."° These courts both viewed the coverage question as a
contractual matter, and simply attempted to apply forum state law
to the insurance policies at issue. Both decisions are substantially
relied upon by other similarly minded courts, and can also be found
at the bottom of the Patrons Oxford decision. In this section, the
analyses of these two courts will be presented and evaluated.
a. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.
The Fourth Circuit, purporting to apply Maryland law, adopted
the narrow, technical definition of "damages" as expressed in Hanna
and Desrochers. The court stated:
Judicial decisions, although not rejecting the rule of construction
that terms of an insurance contract are to be given their ordinary
meaning, have nevertheless limited the breadth of the definition of
"damages" somewhat more narrowly than the [insured] suggests.
"Damages," as distinguished from claims for injunctive or restitutionary relief, includes "only payments to third persons when those
persons have a legal claim for damages. . .

."

Thus "damages" is

to be construed in consonance with its "accepted technical meaning
in law." Maryland law, which governs the construction of this
agreement, has similarly
adopted the somewhat narrow, technical
4
definition of damages.

1

The court's argument stands for the proposition that since "damages" has an unambiguous meaning, the court need not investigate
any further into the understanding of the insured.42 The Armco
39. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying Maryland law), cert, denied, 484 U.S.
1008 (1988).
40. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (applying Missouri law), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 821 (1988).
41. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352 (citations omitted).
42. As will be shown below, infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text, the court
misperceived Maryland law.

1992]

CGL POLICIES

court set forth two theories in justification of its decision. First, the
court argued that the context of the damages clause as a whole demanded adoption of the technical, legal definition of "damages":
If the term "damages" is given the broad, boundless connotations
sought by the [insured], then the term "damages" in the contract
between Maryland Casualty and Armco would become mere surplusage, because any obligation to pay would be covered. The limitation implied by employment
of the phrase "to pay as damages"
3
would be obliterated.
As a general principle of insurance contract interpretation, provisions of insurance contracts are to be interpreted in context so as to
give meaning to all terms of the agreement. The Armco court's point
was that if "damages" were held to refer to costs associated with
compliance with injunctive remedies-therefore encompassing both
legal and equitable relief-"damages" would lose its restrictive
meaning'in the phrase "all sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage," because
there would then be no sums which the contract would not cover.
The Armco court correctly noted, consistent with general principles of contract construction, that each term in a CGL policy should
be given meaning. If the only limitation to the sums covered under
the contract, as suggested by some insureds, is the limitation imposed by the term "property damage," then "damages" truly is rendered mere surplusage. Despite the best efforts of some courts to
argue against this proposition,4' the reasoning is valid. This argument, however, proves too little. Even though the term "damages"
should in the first instance, as a matter of technical contract interpretation, be considered limiting, the argument does not cure the
ambiguity of the term. Even assuming that the average layperson
43. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
44. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 626-29 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989), reh'g denied per curiam, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (Cal. CL App. 1989). In
response to the Fourth Circuit's argument in Armco that a broad construction of
"damages" would render the term mere "surplusage," Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d at 1352, the Aerojet court stated that "aconstruction of 'damages' which includes sums connected with equitable relief is not a boundless universe-such 'damages' still must be 'because of' property damage." Aerojet-General
Corp. v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 632. Essentially, the Aerojet court held
that the term "damages" should be excised from the contract, but that policy concerns justified this result. The court's argument is both unjustified and misguided.
First, a court should have a good reason to overlook the plain meaning of an insurance contract, and a desire to implement environmental policy is not a good reason.
Second, the argument is misguided because instead of asserting that policy reasons
favor excising contract language, the court should adhere to its main point, a correct
one, that the term "damages" is ambiguous, and therefore should be interpreted in
accordance with principles governing the interpretation of ambiguous terms in an insurance contract-principles which have previously been shown to favor a broad
definition.
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would understand "damages" to be a limitation on the scope of the
CGL policy, the strict construction argument begs the question as to
what types of damages are covered. Since this question is not answered by the plain language of the CGL policies, the court should
have referred to Maryland law, which required that ambiguities be
resolved in favor of the insured. 45 This is not to say that an ambiguity as to the meaning of a single term invites a court to rewrite the
entire contract. But it is important to note that if the key word in
the scope clause of the policy is ambiguous, a court should, as a matter of law, look to the reasonable expectations of the average
layperson.
The Armco court's second justification for denying the insured
coverage for cleanup costs is that the form of relief sought by the
injured party defines, and thus limits, the scope of the insured's coverage. 46 The court stated:
In defining "damages," and distinguishing "damages" from equitable remedies, we focui not on the nature of the underlying action,
but rather on the form of relief sought .... [W]hether a particular

cause of action has historically been considered a "legal" or "equitable" proceeding, with the differing procedural and substantive
rights thereto appertaining, is irrelevant. The insurance contract
...is written in terms of the relief sought, and not in terms of the
form of the cause of action. The contract describes "damages" to
be paid, and not liabilities
arising out of "legal," rather than "equi47
table" proceedings.
The first response to this statement is that there exists a third
option in addition to the two listed by the court above. While it may
well be true that the policies are written in terms of relief sought,
the phrase "relief sought" may reasonably be held to refer to the
substantive nature of the injury underlying the damaged party's
claim. This would comport with the insured's probable intention to
obtain insurance against all liabilities arising out of certain types of
property damage, as opposed to an intention to obtain coverage
against the risk of all types of property damage for only certain
kinds of lawsuits. Intuitively, from the standpoint of the insured, it
is more reasonable to expect coverage to depend upon the nature of
the accident, over which the insured has some control, as opposed to
the nature of the relief sought by the damaged party, over which the
insured has no control.
Moreover, the fact that the insurance contracts at issue are writ45. To date, the Maryland Court of Appeals has not been presented with this
coverage question. While the Armco court determined that Maryland would adopt a
narrow, technical definition of "damages," other courts have disagreed. See, e.g., infra
notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
46. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d at 1352.
47. Id. at 1352-53.
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ten in terms of damages to be paid does not lend credence to the
view that the average layperson should be able to infer from this
fact the nature of the relief sought, and therefore know that cleanup
costs are beyond the scope of the CGL policy. If anything, this argument proves too much-it demonstrates that the insurance contract
does provide coverage for some damages. This in turn raises the
question of what kinds of damages are covered. Since the policies
generally do not enumerate the types of covered damages, the principles of contract construction dictate that the court look to the reasonable expectations of the average layperson. Thus, the fact that
the policies are written in terms of the relief sought, instead of the
damages covered, does not serve to dispel the ambiguity of the term
"damages," but rather serves to highlight that ambiguity. Even assuming that only "money damages" are covered, a question remains
concerning which kinds of "money damages." In Maine, punitive
damages, although technically considered
money damages, are not
48
covered by identical policy language.
In fairness to the Armco court, the above rationale was offered by
the court in response to an argument proffered by the insureds to
the effect that the action brought against the insureds was an action
in quasi-contract, and that therefore the action was one at law, and
not in equity. This argument, as the court noted,'40 proved nothing
because it did not follow from the fact that when an action is
framed in terms of the historical distinction between law and equity
the relief awarded will be legal and not equitable. Instead, the
court's argument is simply that the historical distinction between
legal and equitable relief, as opposed to the distinction between legal and equitable actions, is dispositive of the coverage issue.
While the foregoing discussion illuminates the primary arguments
relied upon by courts finding no coverage for response costs, it is
important to note that any argument, however interesting, must
comport with controlling state law. The Armco court failed to adhere to Maryland law, and for that reason alone any persuasive authority gleaned from its arguments should be justified in light of the
forum state's law, and not on the basis of the Armco decision itself.
A cogent criticism of this aspect of the Armco court's decision can
be found in Chesapeake Utilities Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.,50 in which the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware was faced with the identical coverage question at issue
in Armco, also under Maryland law. That court rejected the Armco
decision, citing numerous Maryland cases defining the principles
governing insurance contract interpretation. The court concluded
48. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
49. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d at 1352.
50. Chesapeake Util. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551
(D. Del. 1989) (applying Maryland and Delaware law).
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simply that "Armco misstates Maryland law." 5' The Chesapeake
court stated:
Under Maryland law (as announced by the Maryland Court of
Appeals-which the Fourth Circuit, as well as this Court, must follow), words in insurance contracts are given their customary and
normal meaning. Obviously if language in an insurance contract is
unambiguous, it will be enforced according to its single plain meaning. If, on the other hand, the language is ambiguous, it is resolved
against the insurance company which prepared the contract. Language is deemed ambiguous if, to a reasonably prudent
lay[person], it is susceptible to multiple meanings ....
Any definition of "damages" which is grounded upon the ancient division
between law and equity. . . would hardly be an "ordinary and accepted meaning" in the eyes of a "reasonably prudent layperson."'8
Further support for the argument that "damages" is ambiguous
can be found in the Eighth Circuit's decision in NEPACC.0 . 3 Although that court ultimately held that response costs are not covered by CGL policies, the court nevertheless recognized that "from
the viewpoint of the lay insured, the term 'damages' could reasonably include all monetary claims, whether such claims are described
'54
as damages, expenses, costs, or losses.
On the basis of the foregoing, it should be clear that the Armco
court failed to follow Maryland law with respect to the interpretation of insurance policies. Notwithstanding the validity and import
51. Id. at 558.
52. Id. at 559-60 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). See also Intel Corp. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (arguing
that the Armco court misconstrued Maryland law).
53. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (applying Missouri law), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988).
54. Id. at 985. The NEPACCO court majority has been soundly criticized for
holding the average insured to knowledge of the technical, legal meaning of damages.
See infra note 58 and accompanying text. Presumably the NEPACCO court's contention was that an insurance contract should be considered in the context of the insurance field alone, and that in the insurance field the term "damages" has a clear meaning, even if the term is ambiguous outside of the insurance field. In answer to this
argument, it need only be stated that the validity of that rebuttal relies entirely upon
the principles of the governing state law.

This argument is substantially similar to the one found in Chesapeake Util. Corp.
v. American Home Assurance, discussed supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
More recently, in Independent PetrochemicalCorp. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co.,
Nos. 89-5367, 89-5368, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21337 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1991), the
District of Columbia Circuit was presentd with the identical issue arising from the
same factual circumstances underlying the NEPACCO case. After duly noting the
deference generally afforded decisions of a "home" circuit court of appeal on questions of state law, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the reasoning of the
NEPACCO court, stating that "[dieference is one thing; blind adherence quite another ....
[W]e will not follow another circuit's decision if that court 'ignored clear
signals emanating from the state courts' or 'clearly misread state law.'" Id. at "12* 13.
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of its argument concerning giving full effect to all terms in insurance
contracts, the Armco decision should not generally be relied upon as
support for the proposition that response costs are not covered by
CGL policies.
b. Continental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Company, Inc.
The second case generally cited in support of the proposition that
cleanup costs are not covered under CGL policies is the Eighth Circuit's sharply divided NEPACCO decision. 5 The NEPACCO court,
like the Armco court, recognized that state law (in this case Missouri
law) governs the interpretation of insurance contracts. Following the
Armco model, the court noted that Missouri law provided for viewing insurance language in light of "the meaning that would ordinarily be understood by the lay[person] who bought and paid for the
policy."'56 Although recognizing that "from the viewpoint of the lay
insured, the term 'damages' could reasonably include all monetary
claims, whether such claims are described as damages, expenses,
costs, or losses,' 57 the court nevertheless held that in the insurance
context the average layperson understood the narrow, technical definition of "damages" to exclude equitable relief. 5 Although the
NEPACCO majority wrote a lengthy opinion, the only portion of the
court's reasoning that differs substantially from the Armco decision
is the assertion that the narrow definition of "damages" is supported
by the language of the federal statute at issue in that case, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)5 9
The NEPACCO court stated that "[t]he limited construction of
the term 'damages' is also consistent with the statutory scheme of
CERCLA. .. which differentiates between cleanup costs and damages." 60 Because CERCLA provides a mechanism for obtaining both
55. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (applying Missouri law). cert. denied, 488
U.S. 821 (1988). The court was split 5-3.
56. Id. at 985.
57. Id.
58. The dissenting judges in NEPACCO sharply criticized the majority for strictly
construing the term "damages," arguing that Missouri law did not permit such a
strict construction. See id. at 987-90.
59. The NEPACCO court's argument is based upon the language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4) (1988), which is the federal counterpart to Ma REv STAT ANN tit. 38,
§§ 568-570 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
60. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988) states in relevant
part:
any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected
by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for-
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cleanup orders and third-party damage award,, the court reasoned
that the distinction between legal and equitable remedies, at least
with respect to actions
arising under CERCLA and similar state
61
counterparts, persists.

As weight for this position, the court stated that the remedy
sought by the injured party, whether cleanup costs or damages, can
result in a great disparity in cost.6

2

Traditionally, legal damages,

whether measured by the diminution in value of the property or by
the cost of restoration of the property to its pre-discharge condition,
will not exceed the full value of the property. Thus, depending on
the policy limit, if the insurer is liable to indemnify the insured, the
insurer will not be liable to pay more than the value of the property,
and possibly considerably less than the policy limit. On the other
hand, cleanup costs have been known to exceed by many times the
pre-discharge value of the damaged property. 3 In such cases, the
insurer liable for cleanup costs would be fully liable up to its policy
limit, and in many cases the policy limit would be exceeded. Thus,
the NEPACCO court argued, the remedy sought is significant and
should be considered dispositive.
When the NEPACCO court argued that the limited construction
of "damages" is consistent with the statutory scheme of CERCLA,
the court echoed and expanded upon an idea first raised in the
Armco decision.14 Presumably, the NEPACCO court's major point is
that there is a potentially great difference in the amount of money
for which the insured will ultimately be held liable, and that therefore it is reasonable to focus on the remedy sought while ignoring
the fact that both legal and equitable remedies are concurrently
available upon a showing of the same factual predicate. The argu(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.
As the statute makes clear, subsections A and B address cleanup costs, and subsection C addresses damages.
61. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986.
62. Id. 842 F.2d at 986-87.
63. See generally Tybe Ann Brett, Insuring Against the Innovative Liabilities
and Remedies Created by Superfund, 6 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 53 (1986)
(describing the problems faced by insurers when insuring against liability for hazardous discharges). See also Mountainspring, supra note 2, at 756-58 (describing the
costs of hazardous waste cleanup).
64. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d at 1352, where the court
asserts the distinction between CERCLA remedies in order to bolster its argument
that the proper focus of the debate is the form of relief sought, and not the underlying action.
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ment is unpersuasive for at least two reasons.
First, the argument erroneously presupposes that the insured relied on the provisions of CERCLA to define the coverage of the insurance policy when in fact there is no connection between the two.
In the absence of contradictory evidence, there is simply no reason
to believe that an insured either reads or knows about the environmental statutes prior to procuring a CGL policy. It is manifest that
a CGL policy provides coverage for liabilities much broader than
those arising under CERCLA. Furthermore, as a contractual issue, it
is improper to hold the insured to language not included in the contract. Finally, in many cases the CGL policies will pre-date the statutes at issue, rendering absurd any attempt by a court to interpret
the policies in light of the statutes.
Second, CERCLA's provisions are not incorporated into CGL policies, and therefore should have no bearing on the definition of the
term "damages" as found in the policies. While it may be true that
an administrative agency's choice of remedy may ultimately have a
significant impact on the insured's coverage under its insurance policy, that agency's choice should in the first instance have no bearing
on the contractual relationship between insured and insurer.
B.

The Majority Viewj: Cleanup Costs are "Damages" for
Purposes of CGL Coverage
There are essentially two different arguments advanced in favor of
providing coverage for cleanup costs under CGL policies. The first is
premised on the belief that the plain, ordinary meaning of the term
"damages" does not distinguish between legal and equitable relief,
and so cleanup costs are therefore covered by CGL policies.0 5 The
second argument focuses on the similarities between the various
remedies concurrently available under prevailing environmental
statutes, and concludes that cleanup costs are covered in order to
protect the reasonable expectations of the insured.c"
65. See, e.g., Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir.
1989) (applying New York law), cert. denied - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2588 (1990); Port
of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
Oregon law); National Indem. Co. v. U.S. Pollution Control, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 765
(W.D. Okla. 1989) (applying Oklahoma law); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551 (D. Del. 1989) (applying Maryland and Delaware law); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co.. 673 F. Supp.
1359 (D. Del. 1987) (applying Delaware law); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior CL,
257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Cal. CL App. 1989); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. CL App. 1989); Hazen Paper v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 555
N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Travelers Indem., 457 N.W.2d
175 (Minn. 1990); C.D. Spangler Constr. v. Indus. Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d
557 (N.C. 1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990).
66. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (applying California law); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (applying Michigan law); AIU Ins. Co.
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The Plain, Ordinary Meaning of "Damages" Does Not
Distinguish Between Legal and Equitable Remedies

Many courts that have found cleanup costs to be covered as
"damages" have done so on the basis that the plain, ordinary meaning of "damages" is ambiguous. These courts look to ordinary dictionary definitions as a reflection of the average layperson's understanding of "damages" and conclude that the average layperson
unschooled in either law or insurance would reasonably expect
cleanup costs to be covered. These courts generally ignore the debate over the distinction between legal and equitable remedies,
holding simply that the average layperson would not understand,
and indeed should not, as a matter of law, be held to understand the
esoteric vagaries of such a distinction. The argument can be distilled
as follows:
(1) The interpretation of CGL policies is to be governed by the
mutual intention of the parties, so far as that intention is ascertainable from the terms of the contract.
(2) Any ambiguous terms in the contract are to be construed in
favor of coverage.
(3) Whether a certain term is ambiguous is determined by the
reasonable understanding of the average layperson.
(4) If ambiguous, a term will be given its plain, ordinary meaning
as understood by the average layperson.
(5) "Damages," as found in CGL policies, is undefined.
(6) The plain, ordinary meaning of the term "damages" does not
distinguish between sums which are awarded as legal as opposed to
equitable relief.
(7) The plain ordinary meaning of the term "damages" as found
in CGL policies reasonably includes cleanup costs.
(8) Therefore, cleanup costs are covered by the terms of CGL
policies.6
The courts relying on this argument rebut the legal, technical definition of "damages" adopted by the Armco and NEPACCO courts
by recognizing that because the distinction between legal and equitable remedies is not self-evident to the average layperson, the insurance companies, as drafters of the policies, should bear the burden of covering such expenses. It is clear to these courts that (1) the
insurance companies understand the law better, and are therefore in
a better position to decide which claims to cover; (2) the insurance
companies have a stronger bargaining position than the insured, and
v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444

N.W.2d 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 323 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986); Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan &
Co., 748 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1988).
67. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 65.
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therefore can effectively and unambiguously exclude equitable relief
from coverage; and (3) the insurance companies write the policies
themselves-it is unlikely that the parties bargain over the coverage
provisions beyond the insured deciding what coverage is desired,
and the insurer quoting a price. The essence of this position is captured well by the Washington Supreme Court in Boeing Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 68 wherein it was stated:
The reported decisions across the country, the lay dictionary, the
insurance dictionary, the failure of the insurance industry to write
down what it meant, each of these facts lays waste to insurers' argument. For us to read the words "as damages" to exclude coverage
for cleanup costs, would require this court to rewrite the principles
of insurance contract analysis in Washington, and then to retroactively apply these rewritten principles to the policyholders that
bought their policies decades ago. . . . [T]he industry knows how
to protect itself and it knows how to write exclusions and conditions. The words "as damages" do not stand exclusionary guard for
the industry and represent a vast exclusion from coverage. The
term "damages" is to be given its plain, ordinary meaning and not
the technical meaning advocated by insurers."
The courts that have taken a contrary view have done so quietly.
Essentially, as demonstrated above,7 0 courts falling on the other side
of the issue have simply concluded that controlling forum state law
requires the adoption of a narrow legal definition of damages such as
the one espoused by the Hanna and Desrochers courts. Interestingly, of the courts to have adopted the narrow definition of "damages," the majority are federal courts. The validity of the leading
federal decisions representing that view, Armco and NEPACCO, has
been cast into serious doubt by subsequent courts on the basis that
Armco and NEPACCO misperceived controlling state law.7 1 Furthermore, at least two state courts, those of Illinois7 2 and Washington, 73 have declined to follow the prior decision of a federal district
court applying their respective state's law on the ground that the
federal court misperceived controlling state law.7 ' Moreover, of the
three state decisions to have adopted the narrow legal definition of
68. 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990).
69. Id. at 516.
70. See, e.g., supra note 32 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., supra notes 50-52, 58 and accompanying text.
72. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d
1071 (II. App. Ct. 1989).
73. See Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990).
74. Compare Verlan Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950, 955 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (no coverage) with United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings
Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (coverage); compare also Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Ross Electric of Washington, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742, 745 (W.D. Wash.
1988) (no coverage) with Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 515
(Wash. 1990) (coverage).
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subject to serious dispute primarily due to their heavy reliance on
the flawed federal court decisions. Insofar as a state court justifies
adoption of a legal definition of "damages" on the basis of the
Armco or NEPACCO decisions alone, however, without recourse to
its own state law, the decision is subject to serious doubt.
2. Response Costs, Although Equitable in Nature, Are Covered
by CGL Policies
The second argument advanced by courts favoring coverage of response costs states that it would "exalt form over substance" to decide the coverage issue on the basis of the remedy sought by the
governing administrative agency. In AIU Insurance Co. v. FMC
Corp., 8 the California Supreme Court articulated this argument as
follows:
The costs of injunctive relief, whether incurred for prophylactic,
mitigative, or remedial purposes, do not readily satisfy the statutory"9 or dictionary definitions of "damages." Because such costs
are paid to employees or independent contractors rather than ag-

grieved parties, they do not directly "compensate" aggrieved persons for "loss" or "detriment." To be sure, in economic terms it
may make little difference whether cleanup is performed and paid

for directly by the insured pursuant to injunction or undertaken by
the agencies (who then seek reimbursement). Nonetheless, it is difficult to construe the two methods of payment as equally covered
by the ordinary definition of the word "damages"...
It is unlikely, however, that the parties to CGL policies intended
to cover reimbursement of response [cleanup] costs but not the
costs of injunctive relief, at least where the latter costs are incurred-generally at a lower total cost-for exactly the same purposes addressed through governmental expenditure of response
costs ....
For these reasons, it would exalt form over substance to interpret
CGL policies to cover one remedy but not the other. Given the
practical similarity of remedies available under the environmental
statutes at issue here, we believe a reasonable insured would expect
both remedies to fall within coverage as "damages." Insofar as injunctive relief is an equivalent substitute for the goal of government remedial action, the distinction relied on by Hanna is inapposite in the CERCLA context.

75. Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 391 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979).
76. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990).
77. Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
78. 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990).
79. California has legislated the "ordinary" definition of "damages." Id. at 1267.
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... Under CERCLA and similar statutes, injunctive relief and
reimbursement of response costs serve substantially the same purpose. For this reason, we find CGL policy language is ambiguous as
applied to remedial and mitigative costs incurred pursuant to injunction under CERCLA and similar statutes, and therefore must
be construed in favor of coverage to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the insured.80
The AU court effectively acknowledged that the common law practice of distinguishing injunctive relief from "damages" is inapposite
to cases arising under CERCLA and its state counterparts."1 The
80. Id. at 1276-78 (citations omitted).
81. The California court is not alone in its reasoning. In Lansco. Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), a New Jersey
court held that the insured was covered under his CGL policy for the costs of cleaning up an oil spill because "the State... has fixed as the measure of damages the
cost of eliminating the harmful substance from the waters of the State. Hence, the
cost of the clean-up determines the amount Lansco became legally obligated to pay
and the amount for which it is entitled to indemnification." Id. at 525.
Later, in U.S. Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. CL App.
1983), the Michigan Court of Appeals made a virtually identical argument:
[The Insurer] agrees that the contamination of subterranean and percolating water ... is "physical injury to tangible property" within the terms
of the insurance policy. If the state were to sue in court to recover in traditional "damages," including the state's costs incurred in cleaning up the
contamination, for the injury to the groundwater, [the insurer's] obligation
... to pay damages would be clear. It is merely fortuitous from the standpoint of either [insured] or [insurer] that the state has chosen to have [insured] remedy the contamination problem, rather than choosing to incur
the costs of clean-up itself and then suing [insured] to recover those costs.
The damage to the natural resources is simply measured in the cost to restore the water to its original state.
Id. at 843 (citing Chemical Applications Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 425 F. Supp. 777,
778 (D. Mass. 1977)); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 350 A.2d 520,
525 (N.J. Super. CL Ch. Div. 1975)).
In 1984, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held in Waste Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Ins. Co., 323 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. CL App. 1984), that "the [insured]
seek[s] to pass on those costs of remedying the present harm. Although called "equitable relief," these cleanup costs are essentially compensatory damages for injury to
common property, the ... groundwater. They are thus covered by the general liability policies." Id. at 735.
In 1988, in Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1988),
the Wyoming court held that "[w]e ...

agree with ...

the court in Lansco, Inc. v.

Department of Envtl. Protection that the proper measure of property damage is the
cost of cleaning up the oil when there is no residual damage to the property." Id. at
729-30.
In 1989, in Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. CL App.
1989), the Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
[W]e agree with the trial court that governmental agencies could have ordered Upjohn to act and, had they done so, Upjohn would have been legally
obligated to pay the costs of cleanup ....
We believe that it makes no difference that Upjohn took the remedial action it did before being ordered to
do so and, in fact, we believe that such swift remedial action should be
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courts sharing this view have noted that there is no compelling reason to adhere to the distinction between the forms of relief available
because that distinction does not comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured. In the words of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan:8 2
[T]he argument concerning the historical separation of damages
and equity is not convincing and it seems to me that the insured
ought to be able to rely on the common sense expectation that
property damage within the meaning of the policy includes a claim
which results in causing him to pay sums of money because his acts
or omissions affected adversely the rights of third parties. While
such claims might be characterized as seeking "equitable relief,"
the cleanup costs are essentially compensatory damages for injury
to common property. . . . [F]rom the standpoint of the insured
damages are being sought for injury to property. It is that contractual understanding rather than some artificial and highly technical
83
meaning of damages which ought to control.
The immediate response to this argument is that if the average
layperson does, in fact, understand the difference between legal and
equitable relief,"" that understanding should properly permit the
court to limit coverage to only "legal" relief. This would be consistent with the Armco court's concern with giving full effect to all
terms of the insurance contract.8 5 This argument must fail, however,
because it does not follow that the average layperson reasonably expected coverage to depend upon the discretionary authority of the
governing agency, even if the insured did in fact understand the difference between legal and equitable relief. Governing principles of
insurance interpretation require that effect be given to the mutual
intention of the parties. A considered reading of a CGL policy leads
the average layperson to expect coverage to depend upon the substantive nature of the accident or occurrence, and not upon the discretionary actions of the DEP commissioner.
encouraged rather than discouraged.
Id. at 819.
82. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D.
Mich. 1988) (applying Michigan law).
83. Id. at 1168.
84. In the words of one court, "[the] words and phrases such as 'in law,' 'in equity,' 'legally,' and 'damages' are [not] so confusing and ultra-technical as to defy
understanding and interpretation by those who have need for policies of insurance
.... " Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 391 N.E.2d 568, 573-74
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
85. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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IV.

RESOLUTION OF THE COVERAGE QUESTION UNDER MAINE LAW:

Patrons Oxford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marois
A.

Introduction

It is against this backdrop that the Law Court decided Patrons
Oxford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marois8 8 The Law Court essentially held that as a matter of law the average layperson unschooled
in either the law or the insurance field would not believe that
cleanup costs are covered damages. The Law Court stated two reasons in support of this view: (1) the average layperson as defined by
settled principles of Maine law would not expect cleanup costs to be
covered by CGL policies,"' and (2) previous judicial interpretations
make clear the meaning of the policy language. 8 In so holding, the
Law Court adopted the minority view. More importantly, the Law
Court's decision does not withstand close analysis of the issue-its
arguments are unconvincing, and its reliance on cited authority is
unjustified.
B.

The Superior Court Decision

The Superior Court in Patrons Oxford had found that "[t]he term
damages, in the instant case, necessarily extends to payments which
must be made to protect, restore and/or replace the water supplies
of the . . . third party property owners whose water supplies have
been adversely affected by [gasoline] leakage from the [S & M Market]." 9 The lower court reasoned that the purpose of "damages" is
to make injured parties "whole" again, and "to the extent that can
be accomplished through monetary payments or repair or restoration that can be accomplished through payment of money" such
costs are covered by the language of the subject policy. 0
C.

The Law Court's Decision

Following the Superior Court's ruling that Patrons Oxford was obligated to indemnify the Maroises for amounts incurred in restoring
86.
87.
88.
89.
Super.

573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, No. CV-88-368, slip op. at 6, (Me.
Ct., Ken. Cty, May 16, 1989) (found in Appendix on Appeal, supra note 2, at

56).
90. Id. Purporting to follow exclusionary language contained in the insurance contract, the court refused to extend coverage to costs associated with cleanup operations
on the Maroises' own property, despite arguments to the contrary that all costs associated with the mitigation of damages potentially chargeable to the insurance carrier
should be covered. The court noted that despite the incidental benefit conferred upon
the insurance carrier through such on-property cleanup operations, the policy covered
only damages for "liability," and not for "preventive maintenance or repair." Id., slip
op. at 9 (also in Appendix on Appeal, supra note 2, at 59).
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or replacing third parties' water systems to the extent the amounts
are spent on work undertaken on the third party's property,"' the
Maroises appealed to the Law Court. Patrons Oxford did not crossappeal. "On reasoning somewhat different from that of the Superior
Court" the Law Court affirmed the judgment.9 2 Apparently well
aware of the potentially great environmental impact of its forthcoming decision, the Law Court noted at the outset that it was concerned solely with the interpretation of a contract, and not with fostering or impeding environmental goals.9 3 To that end, the court
limited itself to a discussion of principles governing insurance contract interpretation, focusing on the context of the coverage question at issue. The court noted in general terms that the question
whether governmentally mandated environmental cleanup costs are
covered by CGL policies as "damages," while a case of first impression in Maine, has sparked great debate in both federal and state
courts throughout the country. Without expressly adopting the reasoning of any particular court, the Law Court employed two rationales for joining the minority of cOurts holding that "response costs"
are not "damages."
1. The Law Court's Assertion that "Damages" is Unambiguous
Because the Law Court viewed the coverage question as a simple
contract action, the court applied controlling state law principles of
insurance policy interpretation, relying on its 1987 decision in Union
94
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.,
wherein it was stated:
It has long been the rule in Maine that insurance policies are to
be liberally construed in favor of the insured and strictly construed
against the insurer that drafted the policy. Any ambiguity in the
contract is resolved against the insurer. In applying these rules of
construction to the instant case, the contract language is to be
viewed from the perspective of an average person untrained in ei91. This distinction was presumably founded on the Superior Court's understanding of the on-property exclusion typically found in CGL policies. The Maroises' policy
excluded coverage for damage to property owned by the insured. See Special MultiPeril Policy Liability Insurance, in Appendix on Appeal, supra note 2, at 30, (k)(1).
92. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 17. The Law Court
stated:
We conclude that in the current posture of this case, the Maroises are not
confronted with any liability for damages. We therefore reject their appeal
seeking greater coverage than the Superior Court found. Our analysis might
result in somewhat different coverage than the Superior Court found with
its on-premises/off-premises distinction, but we do not address that issue.
Because the insurance company has not cross-appealed, it is bound by the
Superior Court's judgment as to its responsibilities vis-a-vis the Maroises.
Id. at 19-20.
93. Id. at 17.
94. 521 A.2d 308 (Me. 1987).
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ther the law or the insurance field "in light of what a more than
casual reading of the policy would reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured."98
The Patrons Oxford court neatly resolved the question whether
the term "damages" is ambiguous by concluding as a matter of law
that the average layperson untrained in either law or insurance, "engaged in a more than casual reading of the policy," would find the
term "damages" to be clear and unambiguous.98 The court therefore
strongly suggested that had Patrons Oxford cross-appealed, it would
not have been obligated to indemnify the insureds for any cleanup
costs.9
Upon a close study of the dispute at issue and the extant case law
on the subject, it is clear that the court decided the question on the
basis of the historical difference between legal and equitable relief,
following the decisions in Hanna, Desrochers, Armco, and
NEPACCO. The court essentially held that reimbursement for the
costs of "pollution control," as opposed to reimbursement for the
costs of "property damage," is equitable relief-and therefore not
covered by a CGL policy that provides coverage only for "damages
because of property damage.""8
In what purports to be an explanation for its optimistic view of
the innate understanding of the average layperson regarding esoteric
legal doctrine, the Law Court argued that the Act's provision for
separate treatment of pollution control and damages supports its
view that the policy language unambiguously excludes coverage for
cleanup costs.9 9 This argument, like the argument found in
NEPACCO,100 presumably asserts that distinctions drawn in the
body of an environmental statute can properly impute to the average layperson signing an insurance contract knowledge that such
distinctions will control interpretation of the contract. The court
95. Id. at 310 (citations omitted).
96. The Law Court stated:
[W]e do not believe the "ordinarily intelligent insured," engaged in a "more
than casual reading of the policy," would consider [cleanup costs] to be
"sums which the insured [is] legally obligated to pay as damages." Instead,
[cleanup costs] are the expenses the [insured] may be required to incur to
halt continuing pollution and property damage.
Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 18 (quoting Union Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 308, 310 (Me. 1987)).
The phrase, "engaged in a more than casual reading," seems to be nothing more
than a requirement that the average layperson's understanding of the policy language
be "reasonable." There is no reason to believe that this language, absent more, renders Maine's law substantively different from that of other states to have considered
this coverage question.
97. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
98. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 18 n.2.
99. Id. at 18 n.3.
100. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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stated:
If the Maroises fail to act, the DEP may undertake clean-up action under [ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 568 (West 1989 & Supp.
1990-1991)]. If it does so, its expenses are initially charged against
the Ground Water Oil Clean-up Fund, then recovered from a responsible party like the Maroises. [ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §
569(6), 570 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991)]. Such sums expended
by the DEP, however, are for pollution control, not for property
damage. The statute explicitly recognizes a separate treatment for
property damage. If third parties suffer property damage, they may
seek damages from the Fund, [ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 569(2A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991)], amounts for which the
Maroises would ultimately be responsible, [ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, § 569(6) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991)], and which would presumably be covered under the policy. The stipulated facts make no
reference to even a threat of such a property damage claim.' °'
Essentially, the Law Court has stated that the average layperson
would understand that her CGL policy does not cover costs associated with cleanup orders because the issuance of such orders is authorized by provisions of the Act that are properly characterized as
providing for pollution cleanup, as distinguished from compensation
for third-party property damage.
Apparently, the court holds the view that DEP action to temporarily restore water supplies is not action taken to repair "property
damage," but rather is "pollution control."'' 0 As support, the court
noted that the Act provides separate recourse for third parties seeking compensation for property damage suffered as a result of a discharge of oil to groundwater. 03 The court stated that actions taken
to clean up pollution are different in kind from actions taken to repair or restore damaged property. Moreover, the court stated that
contamination of water supplies does not constitute "property damage.""0 4 It is difficult to imagine how the court could come to that
conclusion, yet no explanation is provided.
It is true that an owner of damaged property can seek monies
from the Groundwater Clean-up Fund (Fund) to reimburse costs already incurred in cleaning up contaminated groundwater, or to pay
101. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 18 n.3. The DEP Clean
Up Order, which may be found in the Appendix on Appeal, supra note 2, at 36, discloses the fact that the DEP undertook temporary remedial action at all four contaminated residences. It is therefore difficult to understand the court's point. It may be
supposed that the third parties did not threaten legal action because the DEP responded, and remedied, their injury.
102. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 18-19. Temporary remedial measures may be undertaken by the DEP pursuant to ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, § 568(2) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
103. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 18 n.3. See ME. REV
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 569(2-A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
104. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 18-19.
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someone else to clean up contaminated groundwater.'0 Disbursement of monies from the Fund for this purpose is clearly authorized
by the Act. 0' It is also true, however, that a responsible party can
use Fund monies to clean up discharges in the first instance; so too
can the State. 107 Certainly, it is fair to characterize such expenditures as pollution control, but that does not by itself justify the distinction drawn by the court.
The statutory section relied upon by the court to justify its distinction between pollution control and property damage'0 8 is more
fairly characterized as a statutory vehicle whereby a nonresponsible
party that expends money cleaning up a discharge is assured of a
procedural device to facilitate reimbursement of those expenditures.
This section is not an attempt by the Legislature to distinguish pollution control from other types of property damage. The Act primarily provides for the restoration of water supplies, not for the rebuilding of physical structures near contaminated water supplies
that become damaged due to the discharge. This interpretation is
consistent with the stated purpose of the Act to provide for summary cleanup of hazardous discharges: "The Legislature intends by
the enactment of this [Act] .. .to require the prompt containment

and removal of [hazardous discharges]." '1 9
Insofar as the court justifies its denial of coverage on the basis of
the distinctions drawn in the Act between property damage as covered damages under CGL policies, and response costs as not recoverable, two things can be said. First, it is improper for the court to
define policy coverage in light of statutory language that is not contained in the policy itself. Second, one of the purposes of the Act is
to hold responsible parties financially accountable for cleanup costs,
whether initially incurred by the responsible party, the State, or the
damaged party;110 therefore, it would be inconsistent to permit re105. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 569 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
106. This conclusion is based on the interplay between ME. REV STAT ANN tit.
38, §§ 568 and 569 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
107. See ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 568(1) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
108. M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 569(2-A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
109. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 561 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991).
110. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 570 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991). It is
sometimes argued that denial of coverage for response costs best comports with the
statutory purpose of holding responsible parties responsible. Presumably, denying
coverage will act as a deterrent against future pollution. See general y Brett, supra
note 63, at 52. An alternative approach is to first make certain that the pollution is
cleaned up, and then to rely on the criminal law to deter future hazardous discharges.
It can fairly be argued that if an insurance company is willing to risk incurring costs
for cleaning up hazardous spills in return for collecting premiums, there is no good
reason to deny them that business opportunity--especially in light of the fact that it
provides insurance against a polluter's inability to clean up his own discharge. Of
course, choosing between these two approaches is a policy matter dependent upon a
legislature's priorities.
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sponsible parties to recover the costs of cleanup.
The Law Court's argument seems to have been borrowed from the
Eighth Circuit's decision in NEPACCO, although that decision is
not specifically cited.' The NEPACCO court found its limited construction of "damages" consistent with the statutory scheme of the
environmental statutes at issue in that action, which, like the Maine
statute, differentiated between cleanup costs and damages. As discussed above, in the context of the NEPACCO decision," 2 the gist
of the Law Court's argument is that, depending upon the relief
sought by the DEP, there is a potentially great difference in the
amount of money for which the insured will ultimately be held liable. Therefore, the court argues, it is reasonable to focus on the remedy sought while ignoring the fact that both remedies are concurrently available upon a showing of the same predicate-i.e.,
groundwater pollution.
The argument is unpersuasive because it is necessarily predicated
on the proposition that CGL insurance coverage depends upon the
provisions of applicable environmental statutes. Nowhere in the policies is it stated that the policies are to be read in light of prevailing
statutes. In the absence of such a contractual provision, it is improper for a court to limit coverage on that basis. While the rights of
the parties are of course governed by applicable laws, such laws
serve to mark the boundaries of the parties' freedom of contract.
They do not positively define the parties' expectations at the time of
execution. Furthermore, the Law Court's argument erroneously presupposes that the Maroises relied on the provisions of the environmental statutes to define the coverage of the insurance policy-when in fact there is no reason to believe that the Maroises
either read or knew about the environmental statutes prior to procuring their CGL policy. To interpret a contract in light of a statute
not incorporated into the contract is to unreasonably defeat the reasonable expectations of the insured. Insofar -as Maine law requires
insurance contracts to be construed in consonance with the understanding of the average layperson,"' the argument set forth by the
court is clearly contrary to Maine law. Furthermore, the court's approach undermines an insured's ability to rely upon the plain words
of a contract. Thus, it is improper to impute to the Maroises knowledge of the Act's provisions, let alone to hold that as a matter of law
the Maroises understood what those provisions meant.
111. Compare NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986 ("The cost of cleaning up a hazardous
waste site often exceeds its original value") with Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Marois, 573 A.2d at 18-19 ("There may be a substantial difference between these
remedial costs and the amount of damages the Maroises would have to pay to property owners for damages to their property").
112. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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The Law Court's argument that the language of the Act supports
its view that cleanup costs are not covered by the policy is unconvincing because there is simply no need for the Act to provide a
procedural device whereby a responsible party can recover costs for
damages to his own property. Although the Act does provide that
under certain circumstances a responsible party can borrow from
the Fund in the first instance to clean up a discharge, the DEP is
ultimately required to seek reimbursement. For obvious reasons, the
Act is simply not designed to reimburse responsible parties for their
expenditures.
Thus, the Law Court's reliance on the Act's distinction between
remedies avails nothing. The Act does provide the DEP with the
flexibility to seek various types of remedies in order to effectuate
summary cleanup of hazardous discharges, but there is no reason to
believe that the Legislature intended those distinctions to be anything other than procedural devices to facilitate the proper administration of the Act. The relief that may be sought by the DEP in any
given case depends solely upon the DEP's discretionary judgment as
to the Act's proper administration. This discretion should not be
held to define an insured's rights under a contract to which the DEP
is not a party.
2. The Law Court's Assertion That Previous Judicial
InterpretationsClearly Define "Damages"
Perhaps recognizing that the average layperson does not have an
intuitive grasp of the distinction between legal and equitable relief,
the Law Court held that even if the average layperson does not actually possess an intuitive grasp of the legal/equitable distinction, she
will be imputed with knowledge of "previous judicial interpretations" of the term "damages" as used in similar contracts. The court
stated, "Previous judicial interpretations made clear the meaning of
the words 'pay as damages' when used in an insurance contract." 11 '
The previous judicial interpretations to which the Law Court referred are Hanna1 " and Desrochers.1 6 As support for this position,
the court stated:
There are many words, phrases or paragraphs in a standard insurance contract that a first time reader does not understand. That
circumstance does not justify excising such provisions from the
contract .... Ambiguity (as opposed to outright lack of understanding) is created only by converting an insured's hope or assumption that every out-of-pocket
payment is covered into a part
17
of the contract language.'
114. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 19.
115.
116.

Id.
106 A.2d 196 (N.H. 1954).

117. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 19.
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Since the insured is "given the benefit of the doubt" only when provisions of a contract are "ambiguous," the court argued, the
Maroises were not entitled to the benefit of the doubt because those
prior judicial interpretations had rendered the meaning of "damages" clear.
It is settled in Maine that ambiguities in insurance policies are to
be interpreted in favor of the insured, and that the contract language is to be viewed from the perspective of the average person
untrained in either the law or the insurance field. "1 8 By holding the
average layperson to knowledge of previous judicial interpretations,
the Law Court has put a gloss on the settled principle governing
insurance policy interpretation: the average layperson untrained in
the law or the insurance field is now held as a matter of law to be
abreast of current judicial interpretations of insurance policy language. Apparently, this knowledge includes the decisions of every
state and federal court to have considered the issue.
One of the reasons that Patrons Oxford is objectionable is that
prior to Patrons Oxford an insured in Maine would not have known
that keeping abreast of previous judicial interpretations was required, or even expected. Moreover, even if the ordinarily intelligent
insured were abreast of principles governing the interpretation of
contracts in Maine, that insured would properly look to Maine cases
to determine the meaning of "damages" in the context of CGL policies. The Patrons Oxford court, however, incorporated the decisions
of Hanna and Desrochers, decisions of the Fifth Circuit and of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court. By holding the average layperson
to knowledge of previous judicial interpretations, the court is not
only requiring the insured to know what those interpretations are,
but also requiring the insured to be able to predict which decisions
the Law Court will find persuasive. It is unreasonable to expect the
ordinarily intelligent insured to gauge which of the decisions of the
fifty states and all of the federal courts the Law Court will find
persuasive.
3. The Law Court's PartingMessage
Under the Superior Court's decision, Patrons Oxford was required
to indemnify the Maroises for any costs incurred in cleaning up
damaged property owned by third parties. In a parting note, the
Law Court clearly hinted that had Patrons Oxford cross-appealed,
the Law Court would not have upheld the Superior Court's decision
ordering Patrons Oxford to indemnify the Maroises for expenses associated with the removal and restoration of contaminated groundwater from damaged properties owned by third parties. The Law
118. See Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 308,
310 (Me. 1987).
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Court stated:
Our analysis might result in somewhat different coverage than the
Superior Court found with its on-premises/off-premises distinction,
but we do not address that issue. Because the insurance company
has not cross-appealed, it is bound by the Superior Court's judgment as to its responsibilities vis-a-vis the Maroises. '
While this follows logically from the Lav&Court's conclusion that the
average layperson would find the policy language unambiguous, this
dictum is of potentially great significance because it suggests that in
the future indemnification for cleanup costs will depend not on the
substance of the underlying claim, but on the nature of the relief
sought by the governmental agency-a decision which usually
proves to be highly discretionary and all too fortuitous. 2 0
V.

CONCLUSION

A. Coverage Best Comports with Existing Law and with the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured
From the foregoing, it should be clear that the better view for
Maine and states sharing similar principles of law is that cleanup
costs are covered by CGL policies. This conclusion best comports
with Maine contract law and the reasonable expectations of the insured. From a technical, legal standpoint, the argument that cleanup
costs are a form of equitable relief, and therefore not covered under
CGL policies providing coverage only for legal relief, has a superficial appeal. The difficulty with this argument, and the reason it
must ultimately fail, is that the law governing the construction of
insurance contracts provides that undefined terms must be given
their plain, ordinary meaning with ambiguities construed against the
insurer. Nowhere in this law is there a provision requiring that the
understanding of the average layperson must comport with previous
judicial interpretations, traditional insurance law, or with traditional
distinctions between law and equity. Furthermore, there is no principled reason to believe that the average layperson understands the
distinction that the Law Court seized upon in Patrons Oxford. The
Law Court is correct in its assertion that the coverage question is
contractual in nature. Accordingly, the court should have given effect to the reasonable expectations of the insured.
Undoubtedly, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to gauge the
119. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 20.
120. Moreover, this statement of the Law Court strongly suggests that the Law
Court does not believe that the State has the ability to recover damages on the basis
of contamination of Maine's groundwater. While this question is beyond the scope of
this Comment, it is important to note that in the next case, the Law Court could
assert that the state lacks the proprietary interest to maintain a traditional suit for
"legal damages."
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understanding of the average layperson. The chief method used by
courts that have attempted to gauge that understanding is to refer
to a standard dictionary definition of "damages.

' 12 1

Significantly, no

definition used by any of the courts draws an express distinction
between legal and equitable relief. Even though the definitions relied upon by some courts purport to be limited to traditional "legal"
relief, these definitions do not unambiguously exclude equitable relief.122 Moreover, CGL policies themselves, which generally contain
a
3
definitions section, do not contain a definition of damages.2
It is fair, as the Armco court noted, to impute to the average
layperson knowledge that coverage is limited by the term "damages," but it is not at all clear from the language of the CGL policies
what that term excludes. Even if the insureds had scrutinized their
policies, all they could have known is that under certain circumstances their policy will provide coverage for "damages." Furthermore, even if the insureds somehow knew that "damages" primarily
covers only "monetary amounts," the scope of that coverage remains
ambiguous because the policies do not discriminate between different types of legal damages. This ambiguity, at least in Maine, is
highlighted by Braley v. Berkshire Mutual Insurance Co.,1

2

1

where

the Law Court held that punitive damages are not covered under
similar policy language, despite the fact that punitive damages are
"damages." Thus, even if the Maroises knew, or thought they knew,
that only compensatory money awards were properly considered
121.
122.

See supra note 65.
One dictionary definition of damages refers to "money paid or ordered to be
paid as compensation for injury or loss." MORRIS, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, NEW COLLEGE EDITION

333. The language "money

ordered to be paid" may reasonably include cleanup costs, because at bottom cleanup
costs require the expenditure of money. It cannot be seriously suggested that a polluter is able to comply with a cleanup order without spending money.
123. See supra note 11.
124. Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 361 (Me. 1982). Ironically, in
Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 19 n.8, the Law Court noted that
its decision was consistent with Braley, in which the court had, it said, "construed
'damages. . .for bodily injury' in an uninsured motorist policy not to provide coverage for punitive damages." The chief consistency between the two cases is the Law
Court's tendency to excuse poor contract draftsmanship while holding the average
layperson to a very high standard. It is one thing to expect the average layperson to
understand that the term "damages" refers only to legal relief, but it is quite another
to expect the average layperson to understand that "damages" denotes only certain
kinds of legal relief.
Moreover, in the context of a Seventh Amendment jury trial question, the United
States Supreme Court recently reiterated its view that not all monetary awards constitute legal relief. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 588, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 1347-48 (1990), where the Court stated, "Generally, an action for money damages was 'the traditional form of relief offered in the court of law.'
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974). This Court has not, however, held that
.any award of monetary relief must necessarily be "legal" relief.' Ibid."
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"damages," they would technically have been mistaken if they believed that it also encompassed punitive money awards. Unless the
average layperson is to be imputed with knowledge of all the subtle
vagaries distinguishing the forms of action and forms of relief that
persist despite the merging of law and equity, CGL policies should
be held to cover cleanup costs.
In sum, unless the average layperson has occasion to grasp the
Law Court's subtle distinction between "damages" and "cleanup
costs" prior to signing an insurance contract, she has no reason to
know-and in fact no way to know, either from dictionaries or from
the insurance policy itself-that "damages" does not include
cleanup costs. The argument that the average insured should be
charged with knowledge of previous judicial interpretations can be
dismissed because Maine law provides that the average insured need
not be schooled in law or insurance. 125 Knowledge of previous judicial interpretations is clearly too onerous a burden to place on an
individual without such schooling, especially when those interpretations are borrowed from other jurisdictions. For that reason, it is
both improper and unfair for a court to deny an insured coverage for
response costs.' It is a fair generalization that in most cases the
insurance companies will have a more precise understanding of what
"damages" means in any particular jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the insurance companies should bear the burden of making
the meaning clear.
By the same token, any argument that plain logic and careful
reading will make it clear that response costs are not covered must
similarly fail. Cleanup orders are only one step removed from direct
monetary damages, are predicated upon the same underlying issue,
and are awarded for the same reason-to expedite containment of
groundwater pollution and, not incidentally, to remedy the injured
party. While in some states legal damages are limited to property
value, and therefore cannot rise to the costs of some cleanup orders,
the reason for the award is essentially compensatory-to make the
damaged party whole. The notion that average laypersons have an
intuitive grasp of this "legal damages"/property-value ceiling distinction is simply uncompelling. The fact that courts themselves
cannot agree only strengthens the argument in favor of coverage.
Furthermore, cleanup costs should be covered under CGL policies
because coverage best comports with the reasonable expectations of
125. See Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 521 A.2d at 310.
126. See Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576
(Mass. 1990) wherein the court stated: "We explicitly reject the reasoning of some
courts that incorporates '[p]revious judicial interpretations' into the insurance contract to narrow the scope of the word 'damages' and thus purport to eliminate any
ambiguity. Lay people should not reasonably be expected to know such limitations."
Id. at 583 (citations omitted).
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the insured. It is fair to assume that when an insured obtains a CGL
policy, the insured does so in order to protect herself against unforeseen accidents for which she will be held liable. These expectations
are best characterized as depending on the nature of the underlying
substantive claim, and not on the form of the relief sought. In this
case, as far as the Maroises were concerned, there was no substantive difference between directly paying the neighbors a sum of
money to clean up the contaminated water, and hiring a contractor
for the same amount of money to do the same thing. In either case,
the cost of cleanup would have been the same. Essentially, this is a
matter of determining the proper measure of damages, which is
wholly different from determining whether or not the costs are,
technically speaking, "damages."
B.

Unanswered Question: Whether the Patrons Oxford Decision
Will Frustrate the Purpose of the Act
The extent to which the Patrons Oxford decision frustrates the
purpose of the Act remains to be seen. However, the potential for
serious interference with administrative enforcement of the Act is
great. The Legislature envisioned the Act as a vehicle to ensure
prompt cleanup of hazardous discharges. The reason for this is simple-the deleterious effects of hazardous discharges increase with
time. The pollutants do not tend to dissipate, but rather to migrate.
From both a public health and economic perspective, it is a simple
fact that the faster the discharges are cleaned up, the better. The
Attorney General, as amicus curiae, argued that the Act's vitality
depends upon voluntary cleanups. 27 The Fund is a limited resource,
and must be reimbursed for most expenditures. For every discharge
that is not voluntarily cleaned up, there is an increase in costs that
must be borne at least initially, and potentially permanently, by the
State-including costs of cleanup, and costs of litigation for enforcement of the Act and reimbursement of the Fund.
It is unclear what effect the Patrons Oxford decision will have on
voluntary cleanups. For those polluters who can afford a typically
expensive cleanup, perhaps knowledge that those costs are not covered by CGL policies will encourage and enhance the likelihood of a
voluntary cleanup.12 8 But in the case where a polluter refuses to voluntarily clean up a discharge, the results are disastrous for everybody. It is conceivable that a polluter who cannot afford a voluntary
cleanup will come forward as soon as the discharge is discovered,
127.

See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 16-19.

128. It can be surmised that insurers, by contrast, will not voluntarily undertake
responsibility to clean up hazardous discharges. Additionally, given the fact that the
DEP will usually implement remedial measures in the first instance, third-party
property owners are likely to rely on the DEP to first clean up a hazardous discharge
and then seek restitution.
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borrow money from the Fund, conduct the cleanup, and reimburse
the Fund as soon as possible. In this scenario, the State bears
neither the expense for cleanup nor for litigating liability. Certainly
this is an optimistic view.
If, however, the polluter does not voluntarily clean up the discharge, the State, and ultimately the taxpayer, is left to bear the
costs. The question for the court is therefore whether, if the DEP
conducts the cleanup because the polluter cannot afford to, and the
DEP thereafter sues the polluter for reimbursement, the DEP can
recover damages within the limits of a CGL policy. Although these
costs result from the same events that would lead to damages liability if a third party sued the polluter for harm to property, the historical distinction between law and equity would treat the costs differently, and thus CGL coverage in Maine now apparently depends
on who cleans up the discharge. When the DEP seeks reimbursement for costs incurred to remedy a harm done to a third party, the
DEP is subrogated to the rights of the polluter under the polluter's
CGL policy. Since subrogation is an equitable doctrine, historically
relief would have been available only from courts of equity, and
therefore no "legal" damages would be recoverable. Furthermore,
since an action seeking "reimbursement" is properly characterized
as seeking "equitable restitution," those costs presumably are not
covered by CGL policies under the Law Court's reasoning. 2 '
The end result is that if a polluter refuses to voluntarily clean up
the discharge, the State is left with the option of cleaning up the
discharge with money from the Fund, and pursuing a decree for equitable restitution against the polluter. Since the United States Supreme Court has found that a polluter's obligations under a cleanup
order are dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code when the polluter is unable to comply with the order other than by paying
money,' if the polluter is uninsured against the risk of a hazardous
129. In the present appeal, the Law Court noted that "the DEP cannot recover
damages in the administrative proceeding it has brought, but can only compel a
clean-up." Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 20 (citing MF RLv
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 568 (West 1989). It is unclear whether this statement is based on
the court's understanding of proper procedural administration of the Act, on the
court's view that the DEP has no "legal" standing to seek damages, or both.
A remaining possibility is for the State to sue the polluter for damages to Stateowned water. In this scenario, if the State can establish an interest in its groundwater
sufficient to (1) support legal standing, and (2) to establish "property damage." the
State could presumably recover damages within the purview of a CGL policy. In Patrons Oxford, although the court noted that the insured would presumably be covered
against liability for property damage, the court distinguished "property damage"
from expenses incurred by the DEP in undertaking a cleanup action. The court
deemed those costs to be attributable to "pollution controL" Patrons Oxford Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d at 18 n.3. It is unclear whether such costs would be
recoverable as damages.
130. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283 (1985).
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discharge, as is the case here, and the polluter subsequently goes
into bankruptcy, the taxpayer will be the party left to clean up the
discharge.
As noted at the outset of this Comment, there are many policy
arguments hovering around this issue, and certainly the Legislature
has the ability to remedy whatever defects it finds in the wording of
the Act. The purpose of this Comment, however, is merely to point
out that the Law Court has frustrated the purposes of the Act without any clear justification for doing so. This is not a policy argument-it is simply a matter of contract interpretation.
Andrew M. Strongin

